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NO. 12 MARCH 2019 Introduction 
Erdoğan’s Comprehensive 
Religious Policy 
Management of the Religious Realm in Turkey 
Salim Çevik 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s management of the religious realm in Turkey relies on three dif-
ferent but complementary components: i) using state institutions and resources to 
define and control the religious discourse and life, ii) incorporating religious com-
munities and organisations into the party and state institutions, and iii) forming new 
religious organisations and communities through family-controlled religious foun-
dations (vakıf). 
 
Erdoğan never made a secret of his desire to 
create a New Turkey founded on pious gen-
erations. To achieve this, he has a multi-
layered strategy that demonstrates certain 
continuities but more ruptures with the 
Republican policies on religion. 
Historical Legacy and State 
Institutions 
Republican policies on religion were more 
ambiguous and complex than is often 
assumed. Although an assertive secularism 
remains one of the central pillars of the 
Kemalist ideology, religion paradoxically 
maintained an important role in the forma-
tion of the national identity and culture. 
Accordingly, on the one hand, despite its 
modernist and anti-religious inclinations, 
the Kemalist regime could not resist the 
temptation of using the influence of reli-
gion over Turkish society by controlling 
religious institutions and limiting religious 
expression. On the other hand, the regime 
also aimed to create a modernised version 
of Islam that would be firmly under state 
control. The early Republican regime tried 
this by replacing social religious organisa-
tions such as religious orders (tarikat) and 
religious communities (cemaat) with state-
controlled religious institutions. While 
the former were severely repressed, as all 
madrasas and dervish lodges were declared 
illegal, a newly formed state institution – a 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) – 
aimed to fill the void. Simultaneously dur-
ing the creation of the Diyanet, all mosques 
became state property, and some years 
later all prayer leaders became state offi-
cials. Thus, despite its rhetoric on secular-
ism, Turkey has been a state in which reli-
gion and the state are intertwined, to the 
extent that all the mosques and all their 
SWP Comment 12 
March 2019 
2 
imams are controlled and owned by the 
state. This provides an excellent apparatus 
for the state to control and shape religious 
discourse, even at the grassroots level. 
In 1948, state investment in the religious 
realm expanded with the formation of 
vocational courses with the professed aim 
of training religious personnel. Three years 
later, under the centre-right Democrat 
Party, these courses were transformed into 
secondary schools (Imam Hatip Okulları, 
hereafter IHLs). The number of these schools 
rapidly expanded under the more conserva-
tive governments of the 1970s and 1980s 
and became major sites for religious train-
ing. Unlike the Diyanet, however, IHLs soon 
became contentious entities. Fearing that 
these schools were out of control, the 
Kemalist establishment intervened against 
them starting in 1997. A technical change 
in the rules for university entrance exams, 
which was ostensibly enforced by the secu-
lar military, made it almost impossible for 
IHL graduates to enter university depart-
ments other than theology. Thus, this was 
a huge blow to IHLs, and student enrolment 
as well as the number of schools rapidly 
declined to almost nothing. While IHLs 
dealt with this, compulsory religious edu-
cation in other state schools, which was 
introduced by the military regime in 1980, 
remained untouched. Just like the Diyanet 
and unlike the IHLs, religious education 
was perceived as still being in line with 
the original intention of promoting state-
friendly religious teaching. 
The AKP and State Institutions 
Hence, when the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) makes extensive use of state 
resources for its declared goal of raising a 
pious generation, it is building on a histori-
cal and institutional legacy. The Diyanet 
and IHLs play a central role, which can be 
observed through the increased visibility of 
the Diyanet in public life and the increased 
importance of IHLs in the education system. 
After the AKP’s ascension to government 
in 2002 – and more so after the party 
became confident of its real power – it 
started to take steps to revitalise the IHLs. 
To this end in 2011, the AKP once again 
changed the rules for university entrance 
exams by removing the disadvantages posed 
to IHL students. This change by itself was 
enough to revitalise the IHLs, pointing to 
a certain demand by the public for these 
types of schools. However, in the following 
years, several technical changes followed 
to ensure a growing student enrolment at 
IHLs, while several regular schools were 
also converted to IHLs. As of 2018, IHL 
students comprised 12 per cent of the entire 
secondary school population, demonstrat-
ing a considerable increase from the 8.6 per 
cent in 1997 prior to the military’s inter-
vention. However, this increase is more a 
result of the deliberate efforts of the gov-
ernment rather than the popularity of IHLs. 
During the initial round of student place-
ments for secondary schools in 2017, IHLs 
only reached a 52 per cent occupancy rate, 
compared to 95 per cent for regular high 
schools. While the government attempts to 
attract more students to IHLs by changing 
the rules for student enrolment and regis-
tration, non-pro-government media outlets 
are routinely filled with complaints from 
families whose children had to be regis-
tered in IHLs against their will. Moreover, 
in the curriculum of regular schools, reli-
gious classes have been expanded to in-
clude more courses such as “The Life of the 
Prophet” and “Qur’an” in order to provide 
further religious training for the entire 
student body. 
The Diyanet’s growing importance in 
public life can be observed through the con-
tinuous increase in the institution’s person-
nel and budget numbers. According to the 
2019 proposed budget, the Diyanet’s cadres 
exceed 140,000 employees, and its annual 
budget, according to the current exchange 
rate, is approximately €1.7 billion, com-
prising 1.2 per cent of the total budget. This 
means that both the number of personnel 
as well as the Diyanet’s share in the total 
budget has doubled since the AKP came 
to power in 2002. The increased budget is 
accompanied by increased levels of visibil-
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ity and prestige. In the new state protocol 
list, which was updated in 2012, the head 
of the Diyanet was elevated from being 
53rd in line to 10th. Even the uniform for 
the head of the Diyanet was changed from 
a modest black cloak to an eye-catching and 
lustrous white – one that attracts attention 
for the head wherever he goes. Yet, the 
increased importance of the Diyanet is not 
limited to such items. The head of the 
Diyanet is becoming increasingly visible, 
and he often accompanies President Erdo-
ğan at public events. Moreover, the duties 
of the Diyanet have been re-organised to 
increase its influence in new areas, such 
as education and social counselling. The 
former director of the Diyanet, Mehmet 
Görmez, made this point when he declared 
that the Diyanet will no longer be confined 
to the mosques. In line with this aim, the 
Diyanet is now working in cooperation 
with other state institutions such as the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of 
Health, the Ministry of Family, and the Min-
istry of Youth. As a result of such coopera-
tion, the Diyanet is now active in various 
spheres of social life such as celebrating 
religious nights at university dormitories, 
solemnising marriages (which was exclu-
sively regulated by the municipalities in 
the past), providing educational support 
in elementary and high schools, providing 
social and psychological counselling at 
hospitals, marriage counselling, etc. 
Thus, although the AKP’s instrumentali-
sation of the Diyanet to shape religious life 
around the country is not unprecedented, 
the scope and resources invested in this aim 
present a novel situation. Moreover, this 
investment in the Diyanet becomes all the 
more interesting given that political Islam-
ists in Turkey have a long history of distrust 
towards the Diyanet, considering, with cer-
tain insight, that the institution was initially 
created to transform religion so that it 
would remain in line with Kemalist expec-
tations. 
However, in a significant departure from 
the Kemalist legacy, the AKP’s investment 
in the Diyanet does not aim to replace reli-
gious communities with the Diyanet. In-
stead, the Diyanet is only one pillar of a 
more comprehensive effort to shape reli-
gious life in the country; shaping relations 
with the social religious organisations con-
stitutes the second aspect of these efforts. 
Incorporating Social Islam 
“Social Islam” refers to all religious organi-
sations such as religious orders or founda-
tions that are not created or controlled by 
the state’s bureaucratic apparatus. Despite 
repression by the Kemalist regime of reli-
gious orders and religious communities, 
these organisations survived and eventually 
became influential actors in social life. 
Although they have differences with each 
other, in their totality they constitute the 
bulk of the religious scene in Turkey. Thus, 
while in theory they are still illegal, their 
existence and impact are known to every-
one, and they have been involved with po-
litical actors for a long time as well. Aside 
from these more traditional religious organi-
sations, several Islamic organisations – in 
the form of foundations and associations – 
were founded throughout the Republican 
period. Although these foundations and 
associations rely on a better-educated con-
stituency, they form a much smaller por-
tion of Turkey’s social Islam. 
Expectedly, the AKP maintains a special 
relationship with all types of religious or-
ganisations. As the AKP’s hold over conser-
vative votes became ever-more consolidated, 
its links with religious communities deep-
ened. The AKP’s relations with religious 
communities are based on a policy of car-
rots and sticks. 
Accordingly, the AKP makes state re-
sources available to some religious commu-
nities in exchange for their electoral sup-
port. One typical aspect of such government 
support is providing land and direct finan-
cial support for formal institutions built 
up by religious organisations. These include 
a wide range of institutions, including 
schools, universities, dormitories, Quran 
schools, and media organisations. A second 
type of support involves opening up state 
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cadres exclusively to certain religious or-
ganisations. Initially, the Gülen movement 
– with a better-educated constituency – 
made use of the bulk of these spaces. Par-
ticularly after the fallout with the Gülen 
movement, some of the cadres previously 
filled by the Gülenists are also now open to 
other religious organisations. Also, some 
of the financial assets and institutions that 
had been confiscated from the followers 
of the Gülen movement are distributed to 
other religious organisations as a bounty. 
Thus, the government has lot of carrots to 
offer religious organisations in exchange 
for their loyalty. 
If AKP fails to receive the support it 
expects, then it resorts to divide the com-
munities. Selective use of carrots and sticks 
is once again the main instrument of this 
strategy. It is fair to say that, in the current 
religious scene of Turkey, intra-group divi-
sions are almost as fundamental and impor-
tant as inter-group rivalry. Several religious 
groups are divided on the axis of pro-Erdo-
ğan and anti-Erdoğan. 
In religious communities that detach 
themselves from the alliance, the AKP 
usually tries to forge alliances with dis-
senting figures and supports them in order 
to either take over the community or – if 
that is impossible – at least limit its influ-
ence by creating an intracommunity fight. 
To this end, AKP governments supported 
figures in the past such as Mehmet Deniz-
olgun of the Süleymancı community and 
Kemalettin Özdemir of the Gülen move-
ment. These individuals had their own 
charisma and claims for the leadership of 
these communities. By supporting them 
and their leadership claims, the AKP aimed 
to control these groups as well. Yet, the 
most typical – and significant – divide is 
the one between the Çarşamba and Beykoz 
branches of the Ismailağa Cemaati. An im-
portant branch of the Naqshbandiyya order, 
this religious group is currently divided into 
two communities, each taking their names 
from the neighbourhoods of Istanbul where 
the vakıf centres (Ismailağa Association and 
Marifet Association, respectively) are located. 
Whereas the Çarşamba branch is in full 
accord with the AKP’s rule, the Beykoz 
branch is trying to protect and preserve its 
autonomy without openly challenging the 
AKP government. However, this attempt of 
preserving its distance comes with a cost, 
as was observed most symbolically in 2016, 
when a Quran seminary built in Istanbul 
by the Marifet Association was abolished by 
the Istanbul Municipality without any court 
decision. On the other hand, the Ismailağa 
Vakfı receives all the benefits of a full ac-
cord with the government, as state insti-
tutions and resources have all been opened 
up for the group in the last few years. 
If all these strategies do not work and a 
community remains, as a whole, against 
the AKP, then outright oppression starts. 
Although the fate of the once mighty Gülen 
movement is well-known, the repression of 
the Furkan Vakfı remains an often unnoticed, 
yet revealing case. This is a small and highly 
conservative religious group with Salafi 
overtones. Moreover, as a movement that is 
highly critical of the Gülenists, the Furkan 
Vakfı partially sided with the government 
during the feud between the AKP and the 
Gülen movement. As such, it is an unlikely 
candidate for government repression, but 
its leader, Alparslan Kuytul, is also a per-
sistent critic of the AKP government. As a 
result of his criticisms, the Furkan Vakfı 
has been subject to increased pressure in 
the last few years. When Kuytul continued 
with his criticisms, he was eventually ar-
rested on 30 January 2018 and remains in 
prison. All the activities of his community 
have been banned, as his vakıf has also been 
abolished. 
Novelty of the AKP’s Approach 
Taken together, it is possible to claim that 
the AKP’s “cemaat policy” is built upon 
three strategies. The first and main strategy 
is to create an alliance with religious com-
munities. Only if that fails are the divide-
and-rule tactics or outright oppression en-
forced. Forging alliances with religious 
groups is certainly not a new phenomenon 
in Turkish politics. Creating such clientelist 
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relationships with religious communities 
has a long tradition in Turkish political 
history, particularly for the parties to the 
right of the spectrum. However, the alliance 
between the AKP and religious organisations 
differs in significant aspects from previous 
alliances observed in Turkish politics. The 
AKP invests incomparably greater amounts 
of resources into these alliances. Moreover, 
the resources that the AKP makes available 
for religious communities are not limited to 
financial means – they go beyond opening 
state resources to religious organisations 
and increasingly enable mergers between 
state institutions and religious organisations. 
Introduction of a programme called 
Values Education (Değerler Eğitimi) is a case 
in point. Through this programme, the AKP 
offers these religious organisations access 
to state institutions and schools and gives 
them a certain role in the governance of 
religious education. Religious organisations 
also acquire a more prominent role in the 
activities of the Diyanet. Although in the 
past the distinction between state and social 
Islam was largely preserved – the former 
being more Kemalist-oriented and repre-
senting the political centre, and the latter 
more in alliance with peripheral forces – 
the AKP has created a fusion of these for-
merly separate religious organisations. 
Although the benefit of such an alliance 
with the AKP may be obvious for religious 
organisations, it is clear that the AKP holds 
the upper hand. The extent and terms of 
the alliance are not always decided by the 
religious organisations but sometimes 
forced upon them. Official declarations of 
support from several religious organisations 
to a wavering AKP government in the wake 
of the elections on 24 June 2018 are a case 
in point. Several experts with insider knowl-
edge of these religious communities pointed 
out that such declarations of support are 
quite unusual, and the impetus for this 
initiative did not come from the organisa-
tions but from the government. These 
movements were not generally enthusiastic 
about declaring their support but were 
forced to make such declarations. More-
over, this is not an isolated event, and at 
several other critical junctures the AKP has 
demanded such declarations of support. 
What is more interesting is that such dec-
larations have few short-term benefits for 
the AKP. Given that Erdoğan already enjoys 
a very large degree of support among the 
members of these religious organisations, 
these declarations have little electoral 
impact. However, they are more crucial for 
assimilating these religious organisations 
into the AKP government and making them 
subordinate to the political will. Such an 
alliance has long-term implications. The 
more such alliances become visible, 
the more that the lines separating the gov-
ernment and religious organisations blur. 
Beyond Transactional Alliances 
This is a fundamental change compared to 
the former alliances between religious com-
munities and right-wing political parties. 
The alliances built between centre-right 
parties and religious communities were 
transactional. The political parties provided 
protection to the communities and patron-
age in exchange for their voter support. 
Group identities remained distinctly sepa-
rate, and the support of the religious com-
munities was conditional upon the benefits 
it accrued through this patronage relation-
ship, but it was in no way guaranteed. 
Although certain alliances, such as the 
alliance between most Nurcu communities 
and former Prime Minister and President 
Süleyman Demirel, had been quite stable 
and long-term, the religious communities 
often shifted their support among different 
parties, creating new alliances before each 
election. This is the point in which the 
AKP’s policy on religious communities dif-
fers most significantly. The AKP is no longer 
satisfied with the passive support of reli-
gious communities. Instead, it demands 
active participation in the political frame-
work designed by Erdoğan. The distinctive 
identities of the political party and the reli-
gious communities have been dissolved, 
and support for Erdoğan and the AKP forms 
the main identity. 
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The desire to preserve their autonomy 
and independent identities explains the 
hesitance of many religious communities 
to declare their support, even though they 
benefit greatly through this alliance. In 
any case, at the end of the day, the majority 
of the groups have yielded to the demands, 
whereas only a small minority have resisted. 
Furthermore, this also ties together the 
futures and fates of religious organisations 
with the AKP, leaving the religious organi-
sations no other option than to provide full 
support for the party. Whereas in the past 
these movements had been spared the 
wrath of the state and government – largely 
due to their civil and independent character 
– this is now changing. Several of these 
organisations even survived military inter-
ventions with little to no damage. However, 
their newly formed organic relations with 
the AKP government mean that they will 
suffer a serious setback if the AKP govern-
ment falls. This not only ties these move-
ments and their vote bank irrevocably to 
the AKP, it also eliminates the possibility 
of a major form of opposition: religiously 
inspired opposition. This is particularly true 
given that, in authoritarian contexts, where 
civil society and all forms of organisation 
are severely oppressed, as in contemporary 
Turkey, the religious realm becomes the only 
venue for the dissemination and organi-
sation of dissent. The crucial importance 
of controlling and erasing the autonomy 
of the religious realm is therefore obvious 
to an authoritarian regime that aims to con-
trol all spheres of life. 
New Religious Organisations 
The expansion of state resources and the 
incorporation of social Islam with state 
institutions and the party are complement-
ed by the formation of a group of entirely 
new religious organisations funded and 
ruled by Erdoğan’s immediate circle, who 
are often members of his own family. 
Although the AKP had largely succeeded in 
its attempts to incorporate religious organi-
sations into the party and state, the loyalty 
of these organisations could never be taken 
for granted. Keeping these organisations 
on track needs constant and delicate super-
vision. Moreover, the fallout with the Gülen 
movement, which supported the AKP loyally 
for a decade, might have exacerbated the 
loyalty problems. 
Two institutions – TÜGVA (The Service 
for Youth and Education Foundation of Tur-
key) and TÜRGEV (Turkish Foundation to 
Serve the Youth and Education) – are two 
typical and prominent examples of the 
efforts to create new religious organisa-
tions. Although Erdoğan’s son Bilal played 
a crucial role during the expansion of 
TÜRGEV, today the Erdoğan family is 
represented by Esra Albayrak, Erdoğan’s 
daughter, on the executive board of 
TÜRGEV, whereas Bilal Erdoğan is on the 
executive board of TÜGVA and other simi-
lar but smaller-scale organisations, such as 
Yeni Türkiye Eğitim Vakfı, Kartal Eğitim 
Vakfı, İnsan ve İrfan Vakfı, and İlim Yayma 
Vakfı. Erdoğan himself frequently appears 
at events organised by these foundations, 
openly declaring his support for their activ-
ities. For instance, in one of these events in 
2015, he stated that TÜRGEV and other 
similar foundations are central to his aim 
to raise a pious generation. 
Similar to other religious organisations, 
these two organisations focus on educa-
tional institutions, particularly student dor-
mitories, with the professed aim of raising a 
pious generation. TÜRGEV has 62 dormito-
ries, of which 12 are for high school stu-
dents and the rest for university students. 
It also has six dormitories abroad. In total, 
currently more than 10,000 students live in 
TÜRGEV dormitories. There is a gendered 
dimension, a division of labour among the 
dormitories established by the two foun-
dations: TÜRGEV exclusively focusses on 
female students, whereas the 58 dormito-
ries of TÜGVA are all for male students. 
Hence, Erdoğan’s daughter is in the execu-
tive of the former, and his son is usually in 
charge of all other organisations. 
However, the activities of neither foun-
dation are limited to student dormitories. 
TÜRGEV also operates several kindergar-
 SWP Comment 12 
 March 2019 
 7 
tens, primary and higher-level schools, as 
well as a university. On its part, TÜGVA 
holds a wide range of educational and 
cultural programmes organised all around 
the country through city and district rep-
resentatives. These programmes point to 
almost limitless financial resources. It is not 
uncommon for TÜGVA programmes to end 
with an international trip to Spain or Cen-
tral Asia or a visit to the holy cities in Saudi 
Arabia outside the month of pilgrimage. 
Needless to say, all these programmes are 
free of charge. In both TÜRGEV and 
TÜGVA, all the lavish activities and the 
exponential growth of the foundations are 
financed by unidentified donors. Yet, 
TÜRGEV is known to have received a $100 
million donation between 2008 and 2012 
from Gulf countries through Bilal Erdoğan, 
and it made the news for the first time in 
2013 during the corruption scandal that 
involved the Iranian businessman Reza 
Zarrab, who pleaded guilty in New York 
on charges of money laundering. 
Distinctiveness of New Religious 
Organisations 
Although the activities of these organisa-
tions all resemble the ones of social reli-
gious organisations, they differ from a 
typical religious organisation through their 
lack of a central religious leader and 
religious teachings. This is often compen-
sated for with selective readings of the 
traditional texts and contemporary Turkish 
Islamist thinkers. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, 
who is known to be the man who influ-
enced Erdoğan the most and whose ideo-
logical works are an inspiration to the con-
temporary political system, often appears as 
a central figure. However, none of these are 
essential, or even particularly central, for 
defining and attributing an ideological core 
to these organisations. In fact, the loose 
ideological orientation enables these or-
ganisations to reach out to the widest pos-
sible number of students. 
Although there is no distinctive religious 
ideology or religious text that will shape 
and separate the students and graduates of 
these religious organisations, they are all 
defined by their personal loyalty to Erdoğan 
and the AKP. Although the history of 
TÜRGEV dates back to Erdoğan’s mayorship 
of Istanbul in the mid-1990s, its resources 
and activities multiplied during the third 
Erdoğan government, and from 2012 on-
wards it has become a nationwide organisa-
tion. TÜGVA was founded in 2013 and, 
since then, several other small-scale organi-
sations have followed. Thus, it would be 
safe to say that since 2012, the third pillar 
of Erdoğan’s policy in the religious realm 
has been activated. This also roughly cor-
responds to the dates when Erdoğan broke 
with the Gülen movement, implying that 
loyalty issues had been the primary moti-
vation in the attempts to create new loyal 
religious movements. The impact of the 
fallout with the Gülen movement during 
the sudden growth of these foundations 
is also acknowledged by the executives of 
these foundations. The lack of clear reli-
gious teachings or a clear ideology – other 
than loyalty to Erdoğan – in the pro-
grammes of these organisations also con-
firms this hypothesis. 
This is an unprecedented move in Turk-
ish political history. Although religion and 
politics interacted with each other in sev-
eral different ways, no political leader in 
history ever attempted to create entirely 
new religious organisations and move-
ments. Moreover, the enormous amount of 
resources and efforts channelled into rais-
ing religious youth who are loyal to Erdo-
ğan also implies the long-term power 
projections of Erdoğan. These efforts, which 
would come to fruition in no less than a 
decade, imply Erdoğan’s desire to be active 
in politics for the foreseeable future – and 
even potentially to transfer this loyalty to 
his offspring. By creating new religious 
organisations, the AKP constitutes a global 
exception as well. Although several Islamic 
organisations around the world discuss the 
separation of religious organisations from 
political parties – the most prominent ex-
ample being the Tunisian Ennahda, which 
arguably announced this separation in its 
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last party congress – Turkey’s AKP seems 
to be going in the opposite direction. 
Erdoğan, who ruled over the AKP with an 
iron fist but did not have the religious back-
ground nor the religious organisation, now 
intends to create a community by all means 
necessary. However, this religious commu-
nity seems to be defined by personal alle-
giance to Erdoğan above anything else. To 
this extent, this is more of a political move 
than a religious one. 
A Comprehensive Policy 
When considered together, it is possible to 
say that the three elements pointed out in 
this paper comprise a comprehensive and 
multi-faceted policy for controlling and 
regulating the religious realm in Turkey. 
Employing the Diyanet as the true repre-
sentative of Islam and forging alliances 
with religious communities have strong 
historical precedents. However, the AKP’s 
policies during the last decade constitute a 
certain rupture. First of all, the amount of 
resources being poured into it are signifi-
cantly greater. Second, these institutions 
are not being developed as alternatives to 
each other but as parts or layers of a more 
complementary strategy. The Diyanet, 
cemaats, and newly emerging religious 
organisations are not deployed as antago-
nists to each other but as allies in the for-
mation of a new religious generation. Last, 
but definitely not least, these various insti-
tutions and communities are merging with 
the AKP and losing their autonomy. By co-
opting all these institutions and organisa-
tions, Erdoğan enjoys direct or indirect 
control over most of the religious realm in 
Turkey. As such, these policies seem to be 
less inspired by religious indoctrination 
than a desire to control a crucial realm 
of civil society, which – as several other 
examples in the Middle East have demon-
strated – is crucial for sustaining an 
authoritarian system. 
Dr Salim Çevik is a Visiting Fellow at SWP. 
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